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Introduction 
Reflecting on European Governance and its problems is in fashion these 
days. Given that the European Commission has a double function as a 
European executive in the “heart of the Union”
1 and as a promoter of new 
ideas and concepts it is not surprising that the Commission recently con-
tributed to the intense academic and political debate over this problem.
2 
Romano P rodi himself announced at the outset of his new 2000-2005 
Commission its purpose of “promoting new forms of European govern-
ance”
3 as one of the key strategic objectives. Obviously, given the scandals 
of the previous Santer Commission, this goal setting was motivated by, and 
was a necessary reaction to, growing concerns for the legitimacy of the Un-
 
*  Paper presented at the Workshop “Preparing Europe’s Future. The contribution of 
the Commission’s White Book on Governance”, Center for European Integration 
Studies Bonn & Europe 2020, in co-operation with the Representation of the North 
Rhine Westphalia to the European Union in Brussels, November 2001. 
1  Nugent, Neill: At the Heart of the Union. Studies of the European Commission, 
New York 1997. 
2  Commission of the European Communities: European Governance. A White Paper. 
COM (2001) 428 final. Brussels: CEC. 
3  Prodi, Romano: Shaping the New Europe, Speech to the European Parliament, 15 
February 2000. Marcus Höreth 
4   
ion’s framework of governance. Besides Neil Kinnock’s institutional r e-
form programme, which is concentrated on the Commission’s internal 
problems
4, the provisional result of these broader inter-institutional reflec-
tions on governance is the publication of the White Paper.  
Unfortunately, for many reasons, the White Paper’s contribution towards 
understanding and towards closing the legitimacy gap of European govern-
ance is not very helpful. In this paper I try to figure out the shortcomings 
and probably unintentional negative implications of many proposals the 
Commission made on the subject. It can be demonstrated that the Commis-
sion’s good intention to reinforce its role in European policy-making, both 
in preparing policy actions and implementing them, could do serious dam-
age to the fragile institutional set-up of the Union. Moreover, it is likely 
that adopting its governance proposals could lead to an even deeper legiti-
macy crisis in the future than the EU is already suffering today. 
I will develop my argument in three steps. First, I will give an overview on 
the multifarious aspects of European governance and its legitimacy prob-
lems in the shadow of the imminent enlargement. Against this background, 
it is easier to evaluate the usefulness of the Commission proposals culmi-
nating in the advice to “revitalise the Community method” (p. 29). Sec-
ondly, I will introduce the Commission’s a pproach, its problem perception 
and  its proposed solutions. In a third step I will highlight some analytical 
shortcomings and overlooked negative i mplications of the proposals made 
by the Commission. 
1.  The main challenge of European governance: 
a multidimensional legitimacy problem 
The political system of the European Union is a strange beast which is dif-
ficult to explore and to explain.
5 Its varying modes of governance and its 
 
4  Commission of the European Communities: Reforming the Commission, Brussels, 
5th May 2000, COM (2000) 200. 
5  See Risse-Kappen, Thomas: Exploring the nature of the beast: international rela-
tions theory and comparative policy analysis meet the European Union, in: Journal 
of Common Market Studies 34 (1996), pp. 53-80.  The European Commission’s White Paper on Governance 
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complex mixture of different policy-making styles, instruments and institu-
tions, prevent a clear definition of the  Union as a classical international or-
ganisation or a kind of federal state. To a far greater extent than ordinary 
international organisations, it has evolved from a horizontal system of i n-
terstate-cooperation into a vertical and multi-layered policy-making body 
without becoming the kind of federal state which we are f amiliar with. 
With his intention to express that the Union is something “in-between” 
William Wallace emphasised the already advanced but yet i ncomplete 
character of its governance structure by categorising it as “more than a r e-
gime but less than a federation”
6. In this ongoing debate
7 academics often 
speak of a totally unique system, a political system “sui generis”. In order 
to highlight the main characteristics of the Union governance it is u seful to 
identify its main sources of legitimacy. In doing so, the multidimensional 
legitimacy problem becomes obvious. The critical question then, is whether 
the White Paper on European governance is able to meet this challenge ef-
fectively, giving a useful in-depth analysis and presenting practical propos-
als to solve the identified problems. 
The European Union has developed into a new type of political system 
which lacks many of the features we usually associate with democratic 
governance. Admittedly, the  White Paper offers a very clear explanation 
which should clarify that Union governance is nevertheless legitimate: 
“The Union is built on the rule of law; it can draw on the Charter of Fun-
damental Rights, and it has a double democratic mandate through a Parlia-
ment representing EU citizens and a Council representing the elected gov-
ernments of the Member States.” (p. 7). But this explanation is far from 
sufficient. Whereas in the past, the European Community relied on indirect 
legitimacy based on its Member States and their complete control of Euro-
 
6  Wallace, William: Less than a federation – more than a regime: the Community as a 
political system, in: Wallace, Helen/Wallace, William (ed.): Policy-making in the 
European Communities, 2nd edition, Chichester 1983, pp. 403-422. 
7  A useful overview on the subject is given by Jachtenfuchs, Markus: The Govern-
ance Approach to European Integration, Paper for Presentation at the XVIIth IPSA 
Congress, Quebec, 1-5 August 2000 and Hix, Simon: The Study of the European 
Union II. The ‚New Governance“ Agenda and its Rival, in: Journal of European 
Public Policy 5 (1998), pp. 38-65. Marcus Höreth 
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pean policy-making
8, the uneven denationalisation of European integration 
indicates that the sovereign state cannot remain the sole focus of normative 
reflection. Since the Single European Act (SEA) and the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union (TEU), the forced transfer of political decisions and allocations 
from the national to the European level has weakened democratic influence 
and control at the national level without the compensating establishment of 
equally strong democratic institutions and processes at the European level. 
Notwithstanding the fact that its powers were significantly strengthened 
within the last treaty amendments, the European Parliament still plays only 
a subordinate role in European policy-making. Even after Amsterdam and 
Nice, the powers of the Parliament in the legislative process remain limited. 
Although the last IGCs have brought about some progress in strengthening 
the role of the Parliament, it is often not the location for crucial decisions, 
most obviously in the field of agricultural policy. It might be said that this 
is a pity as the Parliament is the only directly elected and therefore publicly 
accountable EU institution. Following a simple logic, therefore, it might be 
useful to give greater powers to the Parliament in order to strengthen the 
input-legitimation of European governance.
9 
But the unique Union governance system draws its legitimacy from other 
sources too. Traditionally, a very important source of legitimacy is the 
technocratic and utilitarian justification of European governance, the U n-
ion’s general efficiency and effectiveness in dealing with political prob-
lems. Governance in the Union could be seen as ‘government for the peo-
ple’ – it is legitimate and even democratic in so far as the output of the po-
litical system corresponds fully to the collective preferences of its citi-
zens.
10 The Union, after all, enjoys utilitarian support mainly through the 
economic welfare which it facilitates. Undoubtedly, the success of the 
European enterprise, and therefore its justification, depends on its ability to 
 
8  See for this state-centred view especially the liberal-intergovernmentalist approach 
of Moravcsik, Andrew: The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power 
from Messina to Maastricht, London 1999. 
9  See the detailed refutation of this argument in Höreth, Marcus: No way out for the 
beast. The unsolved legitimacy problem of European governance, in: Journal of 
European Public Policy 2 (1999), pp. 249-268. 
10  See Dahl, Robert A.: On Democracy, New Haven/London 1998. The European Commission’s White Paper on Governance 
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achieve tangible results for the participating countries and their popula-
tions. As long as the efficiency and effectiveness of European policy-
making leads to more noticeable benefits than costs, t he utilitarian support 
of large parts of the European population is unlikely to be questioned. 
Against this background, the European Commission plays a very important 
role. Control of the legislative agenda gives the Commission the power to 
set priorities for the Community, for it possesses powers normally reserved 
for elected institutions. The Commission is also able to produce legislation 
and to supervise its implementation relatively independently of Member 
State interests or popular pressure. In order t o fulfil these assignments, an 
intricate set-up of multi-level administrative interpenetration co-ordinated 
by the Commission has emerged which is r esponsible for the often-
criticised bureaucratisation of ‘Brussels’.
11 The drawback of this institu-
tional arrangement is that the Commission is identified as an opaque tech-
nocratic body which lacks democratic accountability and control.  
As the direct democratic legitimation of European policy-making is lim-
ited, the indirect democratic legitimation of Union politics through the 
Council of Ministers and the COREPER remains very important. The 
Council, representing the executive branch in the Member States, continues 
to enjoy primacy in the Community legislative process. For this reason, 
governance in the Union is s till predominantly the result of net empower-
ment of the executives of the Member States without meaningful parlia-
mentary control at the European level. On the other hand, the d emocratic 
and formal legitimacy of the European Union still stems indirectly from the 
Member States which are signatories to the European treaties. The constitu-
tionalisation of Europe was approved by the national parliaments of all the 
Member States. It is indisputably the case that, in a formal sense, the exist-
ing structures and processes of European governance rest on the a pproval 
of these democratically elected non-European institutions. To the extent 
that European governance is the result of interstate bargaining, it is indis-
pensable, therefore, that national governments acting in  the European arena 
 
11  Wessels, Wolfgang: An ever closer fusion? A dynamic macropolitical view on inte-
gration processes, in: Journal of Common Market Studies 35 (1997), pp.267-299, p. 
281. Marcus Höreth 
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are democratically controlled by, and held accountable to, their national 
constituencies and parliaments. As the German Constitutional Court points 
out, it is first and foremost the national peoples of the Member States who 
must provide  the democratic legitimation for Union governance. In this pe-
culiar federation of states (“Staatenverbund”) formed by the European U n-
ion, democratic legitimation necessarily comes about through the feedback 
of the actions of the European institutions into the parliaments of the Mem-
ber States.
12 But this view definitely suffers from some serious shortcom-
ings. Supranational institutions obtained more and more power and inde-
pendence in order to complete the single market project. Together with the 
growth of majority rather than unanimous voting in the Council, this devel-
opment leads to a decline of the Member State’s ability to control every 
step in European policy-making. Therefore, the state is also a d eclining 
source of political legitimation in the European m ultilevel system.
13 Never-
theless, the Member States are the communities to which the collective 
identities of individuals are still primarily oriented and which possess the 
social prerequisites for stable democracy. Therefore the political order at 
the European level must protect these communities, and the Member 
States, their ministers as well as their civil servants and experts, should fur-
thermore play a decisive role in the multi-level game of European policy-
making. 
To sum up, apart from the defined legitimacy problems, described in ideal-
typical terms, governance in the European polity is legitimated by three 
different sources of legitimacy. These  – nevertheless intertwined  - sources 
could be used as the criteria to evaluate the quality of the White Paper’s 
remedies: 
-  Output legitimacy: Efficiency and effectiveness of European problem-
solving ability and capability; government for the people. 
 
12  Bundesverfassungsgericht: Urteil zum Maastricht-Vertrag, Entscheidungen des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts 89 (1994), pp. 155-213. 
13  Matláry, Janne Haaland: New forms of governance in Europe? The decline of the 
state as the source of political legitimation, in: Cooperation and Conflict 30 (1995), 
pp. 99-123. The European Commission’s White Paper on Governance 
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-  Input legitimacy: Direct democratic legitimation of European politics 
through the elected European Parliament;  transparency; citizen partici-
pation and consultation, government by the people.  
-  “Borrowed” legitimacy through Member States: Indirect democratic 
legitimation of European politics through intact Member States and 
their legitimated authorities (Member State governments, national par-
liaments, civil servants, nominated experts); government of the people. 
2.  The Commission’s approach 
2.1.  Defined problems 
Among the problems defined in the White Paper the following are the most 
important: 
-  Despite the view of the Commission European that integration is a great 
success many Europeans “feel alienated” (p. 7) from the Union’s work: 
“Many people are losing confidence in a poorly understood and com-
plex system to deliver the policies that they want” (p. 3). The decreas-
ing turnout to the elections for the European Parliament (p. 7) reflects a 
perception of European policy as being either ineffective or excessively 
detailed and intrusive. 
-  The relatively weak legitimacy of European policy-making is mainly a 
result of  manifold “credit claiming” and “scape-goating”. In the words 
of the White Paper: “Where the Union does act effectively, it rarely gets 
proper credit for its action” (p. 29). On the other side it is also a per-
ceived problem that “Brussels is too easily blamed by Member States 
for difficult decisions that they themselves have agreed or even r e-
quested” (p. 29). 
-  The less the European institutions are willing to concentrate on their 
core tasks, the more the successful “Community method” is in serious 
danger: “One of the biggest sources of concern is the tendency of Mem-
ber States when implementing Community directives to add new costly 
procedures or to make legislation more complex” (p. 23). This is the Marcus Höreth 
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the result of “the reluctance of Council and European Parliament to 
leave more room for policy execution to the Commission” (p. 18). 
Therefore, “legislation often i ncludes an unnecessary level of detail” (p. 
18).  
2.2.  Proposed solutions 
Apart from the programmatic but somewhat unsystematic declaration of the 
“principles of good governance” (namely openness, participation, account-
ability, effectiveness and coherence) that are “important for establishing 
more democratic governance” and “apply to all levels of government” (p. 
10), regarding the above defined problems of  European governance, the 
required changes to present practices are the following: 
-  In order to relieve the legislative tasks of Council and Parliament these 
institutions should limit their involvement in “primary” European legis-
lation to the definition of “essential elements” (p. 31, p. 6). They should 
therefore “leave the executive (...) to fill in the technical detail via i m-
plementing ‘secondary’ rules” (p. 20) without being bothered by n a-
tional representatives in management or regulatory ‘Comitology’ pro-
cedures (p. 31). These remedies would lead to a more efficient decision-
making and a more effective legislation and implementation. 
-  Under these above described circumstances the Commission could 
promote more openness and transparency by providing more i nforma-
tion about all stages of European decision-making. Moreover, the par-
ticipation of “civil society” should be enhanced in order to “connect 
Europe with its citizen” (p. 3). The practical proposals made are to offer 
more “online i nformation on preparation of policy through all stages of 
decision-making” (p. 4), “stronger interaction with regional and local 
governments and civil society” (p. 4), a “more systematic dialogue with 
representatives of regional and l ocal governments (p. 4, 13)”, “greater 
flexibility into how Community legislation can be implemented” and 
the establishment of “partnership arrangements” (p. 4). In the words of 
the White Paper “providing more information and more effective com-The European Commission’s White Paper on Governance 
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munication are a pre-condition for generating a sense of  belonging in 
Europe” (p. 11). 
Taken together we can identify two main targets of the White Paper’s pro-
posals. The first one is to strengthen the democratic character of European 
policymaking, its input-dimension, by providing more participation, trans-
parency and consultation. The second one to enhance  the problem-solving 
capacity and ability of European governance thereby strengthening the out-
put dimension of Union legitimacy. 
3.  Overlooked negative implications of the proposals 
3.1.  Strengthening democratic governance? Civil society actors in 
European policymaking 
Participation and “civil society” are often used keywords in the White Pa-
per. It is clearly the intention of the White Paper to strengthen the input di-
mension of European governance by enhancing  the “inclusiveness of citi-
zenship”
14. Throughout the whole text the authors promise more participa-
tion and consultation, more communication and wider involvement of civil 
society actors. The paper stresses that “the quality, relevance and effective-
ness of E U policies depend on ensuring wide participation throughout the 
policy chain  – from conception to implementation. Improved participation 
is likely to create more confidence in the end result and in the institutions 
which deliver policies” (p. 10). Against  this background, it is not surprising 
that the stronger involvement of civil society actors in European policy-
making (p. 14) is a declared target of governance reform. This represents a 
very noticeable shift from an output to an input-oriented a rgumentation 
within the Commission. While only two years ago the Commission’s presi-
dent Romano Prodi followed a purely output logic in stressing that “at the 
end of the day” citizens are not interested in “who solves these problems, 
but the fact that they are being  solved”, the White Paper emphasises that 
the European governance legitimacy “depends on involvement and partici-
 
14  Boyce, Brigitte: The democratic deficit of the European Community, in: Parliamen-
tary Affairs 46 (1993, pp. 458-478, p. 459, see also Bellamy, Richard/Warleigh, 
Alex (eds.): Citizenship and Governance in the European Union, London 2001. Marcus Höreth 
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pation” (p.11) because “the Union has moved from a diplomatic to a de-
mocratic process” (p. 30).  
But the trouble with this well-meaning statement begins as soon as it comes 
to a definition of “civil society” and its “organisations”. The magic word 
“civil society” alone doesn’t explain or even legitimate anything. With the 
rhetoric of “civil society” the Commission tries to convince the reader of 
the White Paper that the reform proposals regarding participation and con-
sultation would concern all citizens, but the few more detailed explanations 
remain rather obscure. The only qualification given by the White Paper, in 
the context of the proposed co-regulation with private actors, is that par-
ticipating civil society organisations “must be representative, accountable 
and capable of following open procedures in formulating and applying 
agreed rules” (p. 21).  
Apart from that explanation, the White Paper,  gave no exact definition of 
what civil society is, what it could be or should be. The authors only give 
some examples of concrete organisations and associations such as trade 
unions, NGOs, professional associations, churches and charities, grass-
roots organisations and so on (p. 15). The authors emphasise that the White 
Paper is “primarily addressed” to the civil society actors (p. 9), moreover 
they stress that “civil society itself must follow the principles of good gov-
ernance which include accountability  and openness” (p. 15). But this is 
rather irritating, as “civil society” should be seen predominantly as an arena 
for voluntary action and for open and free public debate following its own 
rules of deliberation. Their actors should not be seen primarily as helpful 
co-governing agents for political and administrative purposes, co-opted and 
domesticated by ruling authorities.
15 Moreover, it is not easy to see how the 
White Paper interprets “accountability” in this context. In democratic the-
ory accountability m eans the decision makers can be held responsible by 
the citizenry and that it is possible to dismiss incompetent rulers. What, 
then, is exactly meant by the authors of the White Paper when using the 
principle of accountability in the realm of “civil society”? 
 
15  See Eriksen, Erik O.: Governance or Democracy? The White Paper on European 
Governance, in: Joerges, Christian/Meny, Yves/Weiler, Joseph H.H. (eds.): Sympo-
sium: Responses to the European Commission’s White Paper on Governance, 
European University Institute 2001, p. 5. The European Commission’s White Paper on Governance 
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However, what is needed in the authors’ view “is a reinforced culture of 
consultation and dialogue” (p. 16) including “network-led initiatives” 
which “could make a more effective contribution to EU policies” (p. 18). In 
order to achieve this result privileged partnership arrangements involving 
“additional consultations” with civil society organisations should be estab-
lished. Almost everyone is included and is invited to be an important part 
of European governance provided that he or she is “organised”.  At first 
sight, reading through these somewhat unsatisfying passages of the text, 
one is reminded of the slogan “Mehr Demokratie wagen”(to dare more de-
mocracy) of the socialdemocratic German Ex-Chancellor Willy Brandt, 
here only translated in neofunctional terms. To be sure, it is good will that 
has motivated the authors to write these lines but it’s not well thought out 
and offers a rather “limited conception of participation”
  16. The proposals 
are designed to stimulate the involvement of active citizens and groups in 
some precise procedures, rather than to enhance the general level of public 
participation. However, when measured against our criteria of legitimate 
European governance many doubts arise.  
First, even when we take into account the concept’s limitation to mainly 
consultation
17, what would happen if everyone takes these invitations to 
participate seriously? More and more participation in the pre-decision 
phase, “additional” consultation, a stronger involvement of “networks” that 
extend beyond and a cross hierarchies and that are characterised by a loose 
coupling of their constituent elements
18, will generate even more potential 
“veto”-players in the multilevel game and would probably make the deci-
sion-making even more time-consuming and cumbersome. Greater i n-
 
16  Magnette, Paul: European Governance and Civic Participation: Can the European 
Union be politicised?, in: Joerges, Christian/Meny, Yves/Weiler, Joseph H.H. 
(eds.): Symposium: Responses to the European Commission’s White Paper on 
Governance, European University Institute 2001, p. 3. 
17  The exception is the so-called „social dialogue“ which gives social partners the 
right to produce norms and co-regulation. 
18  See for a more optimistic assessment to „network governance“ Benz, Arthur: Ent-
flechtung als Folge von Verflechtung. Theoretische Überlegungen zur Entwicklung 
des europäischen Mehrebenensystems, in: Grande, Edgar/Jachtenfuchs, Markus 
(Hrsg.): Wie problemlösungsfähig ist die EU? Regieren im europäischen Mehrebe-
nensystem, Baden-Baden 2000, pp. 141-163. Marcus Höreth 
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volvement of civil society actors in decision-making and control, based on 
the principle of participation, could be gained probably only at the expense 
of efficiency in the key areas of authoritative decision-making processes, 
and hence of problem-solving capability. 
Secondly, seen from a democratic point of view, the input logic of the par-
ticipation proposal is not entirely convincing since it includes only “net-
works”, “organisations” and “associations” but not the individual unorgan-
ised citizen. T herefore, it is more a kind of a modern neofunctional and 
even postparliamentarian version
19 of the famous Gettysburg address, in 
which “the people” is replaced by “organisations”. Moreover, given the 
tone of the White Paper, the reader may have the impression that participa-
tion is not a fundamental democratic right of citizens, or to be precise, citi-
zen’s organisations, but a kind of favour provided by the generous Com-
mission. The subjects being invited for consultation and participation are 
not equipped with the rights and powers to sanction the rulers. The White 
Paper’s appeal to the citizen and civil society is only half-hearted as, 
strictly speaking, “citizenship entails not only to be ruled but also to rule in 
turn”
20. The proposed “partnership arrangements” with civil society actors 
of all kind in most cases are not intended to lead to binding agreements 
which we are familiar in corporatist arrangements between state and private 
actors in some of the Member States. It is just the continuation of existing 
Community method practices with some i mprovements for organised 
groups, “stakeholders” and “interested parties” (p. 14). As these functional 
actors should be encouraged “throughout the policy chain” (p. 10), a “code 
of conduct” should be adopted to determine who, how, when and on what 
to consult. None of these proposals would break with classic Community 
 
19  See Anderson, Svein/Burns, Tom, The European Union and the Erosion of Parlia-
mentary Democracy: A study of Post-parliamentary Governance, in: Andersen, 
Svein S./Eliassen, Kjell A. (Hrsg.): The European Union: How Democratic is It?, 
London 1999, pp. 227-251, p. 227: „Although parliamentary institutions are the 
core of Western political systems, they are undergoing systematic erosion. Modern 
governance is increasingly divided into semiautonomous, specialised segments or 
sectors; that is, it is multipolar with the interpenetration of state agencies and agents 
of civil society.“ 
20  Eriksen, Governance or Democracy?, ibid., p. 5. The European Commission’s White Paper on Governance 
 15 
methods and its underpinning philosophy used by the Commission. It is a 
typical top-down expert-driven approach as participation and consultation 
can only be initiated and controlled by the institutions, should lead to an 
enhanced governance capability, are limited to consultation and mainly d i-
rected to sectoral “functional” actors. Here, the underlying philosophy is 
heavily influenced by the Governance Task Force in the Forward Studies 
Unit which emphasised in their preparation study for the White Paper that 
“(...) in terms of procedural rationality, the opinions of the people are not 
an obstacle to the effectiveness of a decision: they are an essential ingredi-
ent, and it would in fact be costly to ignore them or to fail to contribute ac-
tively to their formation.”
21 Of course, at first sight, seen from a rather out-
put oriented perspective, it makes sense to fulfil the criterion of “procedural 
rationality” by  including experts in the decision making process as much as 
possible. But it’s very exaggerated and dishonest to speak of the empower- 
ment of “people” in this context. Far-reaching and innovative proposals, 
such as the idea, supported by the European Parliament
22, to grant the citi-
zen a genuine right to be consulted, were not even discussed in the White 
Paper. Under these circumstances, the “civil society” is likely to remain a 
euphemistic label for a rather elitist participation and consultation practice, 
limited to those citizens and groups who benefit from enough i ntellectual 
and financial resources to influence EU politics and policies.
23 
Thirdly, it is remarkable that democratically legitimated national and sub-
national governments, national parties and n ational civil servants are not 
included in the comprehensive list of potential participants and partners for 
“additional consultation” in the preparation phase of the Commission’s leg-
islative initiatives. Certainly, the electoral authorisation of ministers at the 
 
21  ‚Cahiers‘ of the Forward Studies Unit, European Commission: Governance in the 
European Union, edited by Olivier De Schutter, Notis Lebessis and John Paterson, 
Luxembourg 2001, p. 19. 
22  European Parliament: The participation of citizens and social actors in the EU insti-
tutional system, Rapporteur P. Herzog, adopted on 29 October 1996, DOC PE A4-
03338/96. 
23  Kohler-Koch, Beate: Organised Interests in European Integration: The Evolution of 
a New Type of Governance?, in: Wallace, Helen (ed.): Participation and Policymak-
ing in the European Union, Oxford 1997, pp. 42-68. Marcus Höreth 
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national level, and their accountability to their national parliaments alone 
do not suffice to provide for democratic legitimacy at the EU level. But i n-
stead of also trying to strengthen the relations with these elected and there-
fore democratically legitimated governmental authorities the Commission 
wants more intense partnership relations with non-governmental organisa-
tions which, as “actors most concerned”, should take responsibility for the 
preparation and enforcement of rules i.e. in the framework of “co-
regulations” but also in “binding legislative a ction”. In the implementation 
phase, however, Member State governments should of course still be held 
responsible for the correct implementation of rules. They also should play a 
role in selective “target-based tripartite contracts” involving the Commis-
sion, Member States and a regional or local authority. In these contracts the 
Commission defines the terms, conditions and particular objectives, the 
local/regional/subnational authority implements them (p. 13), and national 
governments, finally, “would play a key role in setting up such contracts” 
(p. 13) and would be held responsible for the correct implementation. Evi-
dently, this is not a very comfortable situation for Member State govern-
ments since t hey would not only be degraded to simple “agents” of the 
Commission, on its part playing the role of the “principal”, but moreover, 
lose significant influence in relation to their regional and local govern-
ments.
24  
3.2.  More efficiency and effectiveness through changing the rules 
of the multi-level game? The future interaction of European 
institutions, Member States and subnational authorities 
It is one of the main concerns of the White Paper that greater efforts to 
speed up the legislative process have to be made. Therefore, the White Pa-
per seeks to widen the decision-making role of the Commission through 
enhancing its role in the application of new tools and insisting that the role 
of the Council and Parliament be restricted to essential features when legis-
lating, whilst the details should be directed to the Commission. Consensual 
 
24  See also the more optimistic scenario in Schmitter, Philippe C.: What is there to 
legitimize in the European Union...and how might this be accomplished?, Jean 
Monnet Working Paper, European University Institute, Florence 2001. The European Commission’s White Paper on Governance 
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decision-making is criticised as time-consuming and cumbersome. There-
fore, when legally possible, “Council should vote a soon as a qualified ma-
jority seems possible rather than pursuing discussions in the search for 
unanimity” (p. 22). One of the key problems of European governance, as it 
is seen by the Commission’s White Paper, is the “reluctance of Council and 
European Parliament to leave room for policy execution to the Commis-
sion” (p. 18). This means “that legislation often includes an unnecessary 
level of detail” that is “damaging effectiveness” (p. 18).  
The Commission’s approach to solve the resulting decision making and 
implementation problems is manifold. Besides the general observation that 
better legislation and more effective implementation needs more “confi-
dence in expert advice” (p. 19) and a “combining of different policy i n-
struments for better results” (p. 20), the most important proposal is that 
“whichever form of legislative instrument is chosen, more use should be 
made of ‘primary’ legislation limited to essential elements (...), leaving the 
executive to fill in the technical detail via implementing ‘secondary’ rules” 
(p. 20). While “Council and European Parliament should limit primary leg-
islation to essential elements” (p. 23), the Commission “must refocus on its 
core missions” (p. 8, 9) which is to “initiate and execute policy” (p. 29, 34) 
and to be the “Guardian of the Treaty and international representation of 
the Community” (p. 30). Additionally, “Member States should refrain from 
a disproportionate level of detail or complex administrative requirements 
when implementing Community legislation” (p. 23). Finally, a more fre-
quent use of co-regulation is preferred by  the Commission (p. 21) and, in 
following Majone’s famous but also very problematic plea for the Euro-
pean “regulatory state”
25, new regulatory agencies at EU level should be 
established (p. 24) which “reinforce the effectiveness and visibility of EU 
law” (p. 33) (...) “where a single public interest predominates and the tasks 
to be carried out require technical expertise” (p. 24).  
 
25  Majone, Giandomenico: Regulating Europe, London – New York 1996; see also the 
critical analysis in Höreth, Marcus: Die Europäische Union im Legitimation-
strilemma. Zur Rechtfertigung des Regierens jenseits der Staatlichkeit, Baden-
Baden 1999, p. 285-293 and Jachtenfuchs, The Governance Approach, ibid., p. 7-9. Marcus Höreth 
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What are the consequences of adopting these far reaching proposals? The 
main motive behind the Commission’s suggestions is “paranoid defence”
26, 
the revitalisation and “reinvigoration” of the community method (p. 29, 34) 
which was, still is, and will be in future, in the Commission’s opinion, the 
guarantee of European integration’s success. But the Commission‘s White 
Paper principally also questions the necessity of the so-called “comitology” 
which is, ironically, not only a significant part of the success story of the 
Community method but also the nucleus of a developing new deliberative 
form of democratic legitimation.
27 In the view  of the White Paper, how-
ever, the execution of European policy is the exclusive task of the Commis-
sion that wishes to be less hampered by Comitology procedures while 
“Council and European Parliament as the legislature have to monitor and 
control the actions of the Commission against the principles and political 
guidelines in the legislation” (p. 31).  
At first sight, efficiency and effectiveness of European policy-making 
could indeed be enhanced if Parliament and Council restrict their involve-
ment in legislation to the definition of essential principles and if the Com-
mission, while executing, defines “technical details” without being encum-
bered by Comitology procedures. This is especially the case when deci-
sions are made under the majority rule. But this “lean” Community method 
which tends to weaken Member States’ influence in shaping and executing 
European policy could only be an adequate decision-making procedure as 
long as the subject in question is not one of high political salience for n a-
 
26  Armstrong, Kenneth A.: Civil Society and the White Paper – Bridging or Jumping 
the Gaps?, Jean Monnet Working Paper, European University Institute, Florence 
2001. 
27  See Joerges, Christian/Neyer, Jürgen: From Intergovernmental Bargaining to Delib-
erative Political Processes, in: European Law Journal 3 (1997), pp. 273-299; see 
also Eriksen, Erik (ed.): Democracy in the European Union – Integration through 
Deliberation, London 2000; Schmalz-Bruns, Rainer: Deliberativer Supranationalis-
mus. Demokratisches Regieren jenseits des Nationalstaats, in: Zeitschrift für Inter-
nationale Beziehungen 6 (1999), pp. 185-244; the broader concept of „deliberative 
democracy“ is explained in Habermas, Jürgen: The Postnational Constellation: Phi-
losophical Essays, chapter 4, Cambridge 2001. The European Commission’s White Paper on Governance 
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tional constituencies.
28 If this is the case, legitimate majority rule presup-
poses a strong European collective identity which is not realised in the pre-
sent Union. Therefore, European policy, especially in areas which are 
highly controversial between the Member States, must still be the result of 
an intergovernmental consensus. For the same reason, it is dubious to e x-
hort the Council to forego the search for unanimity and to pursue qualified 
majority voting wherever possible to speed-up the legislative process. This 
advice  ignores the complex nature of interstate compromise and minority 
protection which reflects the existing basis of and limits to trust and soli-
darity within the emergent Euro-polity.   
Against this background, it is highly questionable to propose a strategy 
which tends to strengthen the role of the Commission at the expense of the 
Member States and their generally consensus-seeking approach to Euro-
pean policymaking. As a crucial element of the zero-sum-constellation 
among the different sources of legitimacy
29  this would be the inevitable 
consequence when following the advice of the White Paper to restrict the 
legislative role of Parliament and Council to a definition of essential prin-
ciples, while leaving the decision on technical details, which indeed could 
be highly controversial at the end,
30 to the discretion of the Commission. 
Thus even the current time-consuming practices during the preparatory 
phase are better than adopting the Commission’s new strategy. “Given the 
diversity of economic conditions, political cultures, institutional structures, 
policy legacies and public attention among Member States, it seems inevi-
table that many policy choices below the level of ‘essential principles’ will 
have high political salience and might be totally unacceptable in one coun-
try or another. At present, these pitfalls are avoided by the search for con-
sensual solutions that avoid incompatibilities with specific national con-
straints in elaborate intergovernmental negotiations that take place in the 
preparatory phase before a Council decision as well as in the implementa-
 
28  See also Scharpf, Fritz: European Governance: Common Concern vs. The Chal-
lenge of Diversity, MPIfG Working Paper 01/6, September 2001, p. 2 ff. 
29  See in detail Höreth, Die Europäische Union im Legitimationstrilemma, ibid. 
30  See for examples Scharpf, European Governance, ipd., p. 5. Marcus Höreth 
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tion phase.”
31 It is exactly the main function of the Committee of Perma-
nent Representatives (COREPER) to solve potential conflicts among 
Member States before they reach the Council. This function could be seri-
ously damaged if the Commission kept its promise to “withdraw proposals 
where inter-institutional bargaining undermines (...) the proposal’s objec-
tives” (p. 22).  
Regarding the implementation of Council decisions it is understandable 
that the Commission w ishes to have a powerful say when further specifica-
tions are needed before directives can be applied. In practice the Commis-
sion already perform this function together with Comitology committees in 
which regulations proposed by the Commission are discussed by civil ser-
vants and experts nominated by Member State governments. Theoretically, 
“management committees” and “regulatory committees” have the authori-
sation to disagree with a Commission’s proposal and to appeal to the 
Council for a final decision. Of course this option (in practice almost never 
used) weakens the position of the Commission but it’s counterproductive to 
demand the abolition of these committees (p. 31) as their existence effec-
tively forces the Commission to search for consensual solutions in the i m-
plementation phase as well. Therefore, this complex consensus-seeking 
implementation procedure  – legally confirmed by the European Court of 
Justice
32 - is worth preserving, as it is one of the most important prerequi-
sites for compliance in the Member States in the end.
33  
 
31  Scharpf, European Governance, ibid., p. 6. 
32  Ehlermann, Claus Dieter: Institutionelle Probleme im Bereich der Durchführung des 
abgeleiteten Gemeinschaftsrechts, in: Europarecht 6 (1971), pp. 250-261. 
33  See in detail Falke, Josef: Komitologie – Entwicklung, Rechtsgrundlagen und erste 
empirische Annäherung, in: Joerges, Christian/Falke, Josef (Hrsg.): Das Ausschuß-
wesen der Europäischen Union. Praxis der Risikoregulierung im Binnenmarkt und 
ihre rechtliche Verfassung, Baden-Baden 2000, pp. 43-160.  The European Commission’s White Paper on Governance 
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Of course one might agree with the Commission’s proposals to make Euro-
pean decision-making more efficient and implementation more effective at 
first sight. Current practices are often annoying because not only are they 
time-consuming and cumbersome but also they water down initially rea-
sonable proposals from the Commission. Moreover, when being discussed 
in the Comitology committees, proposals are often overloaded with admin-
istrative details satisfying specific national demands. In  the end, the Com-
mission is incorrectly blamed for over-detailed and complex regulations 
which in reality are caused by specific concerns of the Member States and 
their administrations. Nevertheless, seen from a broader interinstitutional 
perspective it is  not useful to change this uncomfortable situation of the 
Commission by redefining the rules of the multilevel game of European 
decision making and  –implementing so as to replace consensus-seeking 
mechanisms with unilateral powers of the Commission.  
Apart  from that, it is normatively unacceptable that the Commission wants 
to use the thread to withdraw initiatives when they are in danger of being 
changed by intergovernmental negotiations. This is for two reasons. First, 
this confrontation strategy is surely  not normatively compatible with the 
“principles of good governance” which are favoured and praised by the au-
thors in the first pages of the White Paper. Secondly, if the Commission 
frequently uses this thread, the Council could react in a same unproductive 
manner, by simply rejecting Commission initiatives which do not respond 
exactly to the demands of the Member States, demands that would other-
wise be met in consensus-seeking negotiations. To put it in Fritz Scharpf‘s 
words: “(...) in a decision system with multiple veto positions, confronta-
tion strategies can in principle be played by all parties  – and if they are 
played by all, gridlock is the most likely outcome. By the same token, it is 
hard to see how the Commission could force Member States to accept the 
abolition of the Comitology system and to leave legislative choices in the 
‘implementation’ stage entirely to its own discretion.”
34 
To conclude, measured against the above-defined evaluation criteria of l e-
gitimate European governance, the Commission’s proposals to enhance e f-
 
34  Scharpf, European Governance, ibid., p. 7. Marcus Höreth 
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ficiency and effectiveness of European policymaking are doomed to fail. 
The fundamental change of current practices in European policymaking 
and implementing, would hardly make European legislating more efficient 
and effective (output legitimacy). Secondly, it is hard to see how the input 
legitimacy of European governance could be strengthened as the proposals 
don’t give the European Parliament more significant influence in policy 
shaping during the implementation phase. Thirdly, measured against the 
criterion of “borrowed” legitimacy of European policies through Member 
States and their legitimated authorities, the White Paper proposals would 
evidently weaken the indirect democratic legitimation of European policies 
that is derived from the agreement of democratically elected Member State 
governments. 
4.  Conclusion: Rethinking the multidimensional 
requirements for legitimate EU governance 
The authors of the White Paper are right when warning the reader at the 
outset that they do not and cannot be expected to “provide a magic cure for 
everything”. But it is not only unfortunate that the Commission’s White 
Paper has overlooked many challenges of European governance.
35 It is also 
annoying that it gives the wrong answers to actually identified challenges 
and pays only lip service to the legitimacy problems of the Union. More-
over, some details in the White Paper are simply untrue: It is simply wrong 
to stress that the EU’s powers “are given by its citizens” (p. 8). The Euro-
pean Union’s institutions are exercising powers which either were dele-
gated by the governments of Member States or were usurped by the Com-
mission and the European Court of Justice through far-reaching interpreta-
tions of Treaty provisions.
36 And how can the contradiction be explained 
that, on the one hand, citizens give their powers to the European Union, 
while, on the other hand, the same people are blamed for their ignorance as 
 
35  This is the main argument in Scharpf, European Governance, ipd., p. 13. 
36  See Höreth, Marcus: Stille Revolution im Namen des Rechts? Zur Rolle des Euro-
päischen Gerichtshofes im Prozess der europäischen Integration, ZEI Discussion 
Paper, C, 78, Bonn 2000. The European Commission’s White Paper on Governance 
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they do not even “know the difference b etween the institutions” (p. 8)? 
Here again, in reducing the l egitimacy gap of European governance to a 
rather technical information problem and a simple lack of knowledge, the 
Commission’s approach is primarily a technocratic one camouflaged in 
would-be democratic terms. The truth behind such fine words as “democ-
racy”, “transparency” and “participation” is that the White Paper reflects a 
rather technocratic attitude on how to solve the governance problems.  
Even more annoying is the fact that the Commission’s White Paper reveals 
a lack of understanding of the pre-conditions of successful governance in 
the multi-layered system of the European Union. Of course, given the fact 
that the Commission wants to regain lost ground which they lost in relation 
to Parliament and Council, especially in the running of the new co-decision 
procedure that was established by the Amsterdam Treaty (TEU Article 
251), and surely wants to reassert its important role in the system of inter-
institutional decision-making, most proposals in the White Paper are read-
ily understood
37. Many suggestions of the White Paper may be interpreted 
as attempts to regain power in the interinstitutional decision making proc-
ess: the avoidance of over-detailed legislation and the use of other policy 
tools, the strategic use of the right to withdraw legislative proposals, the 
restriction and even partial abolition of comitology, and, last but not least, 
the use of regulatory agencies under the control of the Commission. Never-
theless, as we have seen above, on normative grounds it is not reasonable to 
make proposals w hich will reduce the role of Member States in policymak-
ing and implementation by seeking to bypass them wherever possible. 
It is, then, puzzling how self-centred the White Paper’s view on European 
governance is. When reading the paper one may sometimes have the i m-
pression that the Commission is fighting a pointless zero-sum-battle against 
the Member States  – officially in the name of the venerable “Community 
method” but unofficially in order to jealously preserve its own vested inter-
 
37  Héritier, Adrienne: The White Paper on European Governance: A Response to 
Shifting Weights in Interinstitutional Decision-Making, in: J oerges, Chris-
tian/Meny, Yves/Weiler, Joseph H.H. (eds.): Symposium: Responses to the Euro-
pean Commission’s White Paper on Governance, European University Institute, 
Florence 2001. Marcus Höreth 
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ests. But legitimate multilevel governance in Europe r equires that at all 
levels, authorities and institutions involved find solutions to problems and 
constraints; especially those that the Single Market Project itself caused for 
Member States in policy areas which have not been  Europeanised.
38 If the 
European Union wants to be part of a solution “it can only be so in an ena-
bling role which must support and strengthen, rather than undermine, the 
political legitimacy, institutional integrity and problem-solving capacity of 
Member States.”
39 Against this background, the concept of “autonomy-
compatible co-ordination”
40 combined with patterns of differentiated inte-
gration, “closer cooperation” and “open coordination” is a useful “preser-
vationist”
41 strategy for European governance which is not systematically 
discussed by the authors of the White Paper. As long as the European gov-
ernance system lacks a sufficient collective identity and intermediary struc-
tures which effectively integrate different political, economic and s ocial 
interests into the European Polity, it will also lack the quality of ‘govern-
ment by the people’. Therefore, it is indisputably the case that legitimate 
governance in Europe depends to a large degree on strong and intact Mem-
ber States, where we still find these criteria fulfilled. Against this back-
ground, it is counterproductive to weaken the sources of legitimacy stem-
ming indirectly from the involvement of Member States in European poli-
cymaking processes; which seems to be one of the main objectives of the 
White Paper.  Not only the administrative resources but especially the l e-
gitimacy basis of the Commission are much too weak to do without this 
“borrowed” legitimacy of Member States both in the preparation phase and 
in the implementation phase of European policymaking.  In brief, consen-
sus-seeking modes of governance may be costly and cumbersome at first 
 
38  See in detail Scharpf, Fritz: Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic?, Ox-
ford 1999. 
39  Scharpf, European Governance, ibid., p. 9; See in detail Höreth, Die Europäische 
Union im Legitimationstrilemma, ibid., pp. 307-322. 
40  Scharpf, Fritz: Community and autonomy: multi-level policy-making in the Euro-
pean Union, in: Journal of European Public Policy 1 (1994), pp. 219-241. 
41  Gustavsson, Sverker: Double asymmetry as normative challenge, in: Follesdal, An-
dreas/Koslwoski, Peter (eds.): Democracy and the European Union, Berlin and Hei-
delberg 1998, pp. 108-131, p. 115. The European Commission’s White Paper on Governance 
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sight, but they lend legitimacy to policymaking in fragmented systems of 
decision-making which lack a collective identity.  
Legitimate European governance is a two-sided  coin: What is urgently 
needed for a more legitimate governance in Europe is both more national 
respect for the Commission’s worthy contributions to European solutions 
and also more European respect for the autonomy of Member States and 
their idiosyncratic  preferences, policies and institutions. It is of course dif-
ficult to combine respect for the autonomy of Member States on the one 
hand with a sense of the need for European level regulation on the other 
hand. But within the present institutional structures and procedures of the 
Community and its fragile triangle of legitimacy, it makes sense to develop 
careful strategies of differentiated integration and “closer cooperation” 
which increase the European capacity for problem-solving even in policy 
areas of high divergent national interests without ignoring the need of the 
Member States for autonomous solutions. Possible instruments could i n-
clude the more frequent use of so-called „framework directives“ that leave 
the formulation of more specific regulations and the i mplementation to 
Member States instead of Commission and Comitology procedures. This is 
also proposed in general by the White Paper. It could effectively work 
when being combined with “open methods of co-ordination” in which 
Member States after legislating “essential elements” at the European level 
have to make clear what they intend to do at home. This new policy tool 
facilitates further co-operation and the exchange of “best practice” in view 
of common targets. Of course, open methods of co-ordination could be 
monitored through the Commission (see p. 22) that “should be closely i n-
volved and play a coordinating role” (p. 22) and, moreover should be 
evaluated by peer review. Last but not least, if necessary, the Council could 
make additional legislation in reaction to implementation problems, special 
deficiencies or, in the worst case, “beggar-my-neighbour”- behaviour of 
individual Member States.  
Under the shadow of the ongoing enlargement process, it should be wel-
comed that the Commission’s White Paper makes proposals heading in this 
direction. It is to be expected that both new tools, “co-regulation” and the 
“open method of co-ordination”, lead to less resistance from those who Marcus Höreth 
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bear the costs of implementation, may that be private actors in the case of 
co-regulation or Member States in the case of the open method; because in 
the context of these new tools, “actors most concerned” have a say in shap-
ing the policy goals and the instruments to be used. To be sure, these new 
policy tools may also have their disadvantages as these instruments offer 
less legal certainty.
42 But no argument can explain why the relatively flexi-
ble mechanism of open coordination should be limited to policy areas in 
which legislative action under the Community method is not possible, as 
the White Paper demands (p. 22). To quote Fritz Scharpf again: “(...) 
Member States would not need to march in step to the bark of the Commis-
sion’s drill sergeant to demonstrate that they are good Europeans. Instead, 
they could respond to the specific problems they are facing with solutions 
that are compatible within their existing institutional framework. At the 
same time, however, n ational policy choices would be disciplined by the 
challenge to achieve jointly defined targets and by the institutionalised 
need to consider their impact on other Member States. In short, in develop-
ing the open method of coordination, the Union may have discovered a 
constructive approach to dealing with the growing pressure for European 
solutions under conditions of politically salient diversity.”
43 To be sure, it is 
difficult to realise these proposals in practice  – but it is of course better to 
concentrate on such problems and their solutions than to hold either ‘Brus-
sels’ or the ‘Member States’ to be exclusively responsible for the veritable 
legitimacy crisis of European governance. Obviously we need both strong 
European  and national institutions to solve the problem of how Europe 
should be governed in the future. 
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